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THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAw JOURNAL

LEGAL ASPECTS OF TRADE WITH AND
INVESTMENT IN THE REPUBLIC OF
CHINA ON TAIWAN: THE
GERMAN EXPERIENCE
ROBERT HEUSER*
I.

INTRODUCTIONt

It is the purpose of this paper to show a pattern of economic
relationship between two countries whose economies are greatly
dependent on foreign trade but whose trading citizens have to deal
* Dr. iur., research fellow, Max-Planck-Institute for Comparative Public Law
and International Law, Heidelberg; associated with Dr. Wellbrock and Partners,
law office, Heidelberg.
t Abbreviations: ABI. = Amtsblatt der EuropAischen Gemeinschaften (EEC
Gazette); AHD = Aussenhandelsdienst (Dtisseldorf); AWD = Aussenwirtschaftsdienst, Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft (Heidelberg); BGBl. = Bundesgesetzblatt (Gazette of the FRG); Cosway-Ma-Shattuck = R. Cosway, H. P. Ma, W.
Shattuck, Trade and Investment in Taiwan, Taipei 1973; DWD = (Die Aussenwirtschaft, Deutscher Wirtschaftsdienst, (K6ln); F. A. = Freies Asien (Bonn); ILM =
International Legal Materials; TIP = Taiwan Industrial Panorama.
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without much governmental assistance because of the lack of
diplomatic relations.
The information upon which this paper is based has mainly
been obtained from Chinese and German legal sources, from
relevant German journals and from interviews I had with Chinese
representatives in Germany as well as with members of German
institutes (including the German Ministry of Economic Affairs),
finally with executives of German capital and merchandise
exporting companies.
Let me make at the beginning some short remarks concerning
the development of Chinese-German economic relations in
general, providing you with some statistical data.
II.

GERMAN-CHINESE TRADE AND GERMAN INVESTMENT

IN TAIWAN: SOME HISTORICAL AND
STATISTICAL DATA

The development of economic relations between the Federal
Republic of Germany (FRG) and the ROC reflects the relevant prewar experiences: a comparatively high trade exchange on the one
hand and a comparatively small investment willingness on the

other, a phenomenon -

by the way -

which can be observed in

German foreign economic activities in general. Direct investments
of German companies in developing countries are only one-half of
the French, one-third of the British and one-ninth of the U.S.
private investments in those countries., The reasons for this are
highly complex - experiences of expropriation and confiscation
after two world wars, comparatively little training in dealing in
and with non-European countries because of limited experience as
an imperial power, may be mentioned.
A new beginning of ROC-German commercial interest after
World War II came no earlier than the end of the fifties,
increasing in the sixties, and taking on considerable volume in the
seventies.
Taiwan's development in to one of the leading industrialized
countries in the Far East within less than one decade, becoming
able to offer her industrial products to the markets of South-East
Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Europe and the Americas was
1. See, e.g., E. Eppler, Wenig Zeit fUr die Dritte Welt, Stuttgart 1971, at 88. For
a broader inquiry into the problem of direct investment in developing countries see
Awni-Al-Ani, German Investment in Developing Countries, in: Intereconomics
(Hamburg), No. 7, 1969, 219-221.
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carefully observed in German commercial circles. 2 It was noticed
with satisfaction by potential German traders and investors that
the ROC government promoted the economy of the country
according to the principles of a free enterprise, supporting the
extension of the private sector of the economy as well as a more
active participation of private domestic and foreign capital, 3 that
the establishment of Export Processing Zones was of such great
success as to become a model for other developing countries, 4 and
that the government was reorganizing the foreign-trade bureau6
cracy 5 and simplifying investment formalities.

The comprehensive market studies undertaken by the Chinese
Industrial Development and Investment Center (IDIC) regarding
the development of industries emphasized six branches of
industry as deserving preferential support: petrochemical, plastics, electronic, steel, watch-making and synthethic resin industries. It is clear that such emphasis would appeal greatly to
German economic interests.
Since the end of the fifties the Federal Republic has played an
active role in Taiwan's economy. Leading German producers of
the chemicals industry are represented in Taiwan, and German
experts of various industrial branches are advising domestic
companies, many of which are producing under a German license.
German industries have delivered - partly with U.S. financial
assistance - a remarkable share of industrial equipment in
Taiwan. German firms supply on a basis of long-term payment.
Examples are the "Southeast Soda Ash Plant" in Suao, cement
plants, machinery for cargo-ships, and projects in the field of
traffic and communication and more recently in the field of petrochemistry.
Looking at some figures we realize the continuous growth of
foreign trade between the ROC and the FRG. In 1954 Germany's
2. See, e.g., AHD vol. 19 (1965), at 600: Taiwans Werdegang zum autarken
Staat; DWD 1963, No. 23: Der industrielle Aufschwung in Taiwan; id. 1966, at 1142:
Giinstiges Investitionsklima fidrdert den industriellen Aufbau in Taiwan; id. 1967,
at 791: Auslindische Privatinvestitionen forcieren wirtschaftliche Prosperitit
Taiwans. For a scholarly assessment see J. Riedel, Wirtschaftspolitik und
Exportentwicklung in Taiwan, in: Die Weltwirtschaft, 1975, No. 1, 100-113.
3. In AHD vol. 22 (1968) at 190 "the excellent opportunities for foreign
investment in Taiwan" ("a model case of economic development within the
developing countries") are stressed.
4. AHD vol. 26 (1972), at 952.
5. AHD vol. 23 (1969), at 40.
6. AHD vol. 22 (1968), at 536.
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share of Taiwan's total imports was 2.46%, 4.74% in 1961, 5.1% in
1969 and 5% in 1976. Germany's share of Taiwan's total exports
was 1.82% in 1954, 3.83% in 1961, 4% in 1969 and 4.7% in 1976.
Expressed in absolute figures, the value of Taiwan's imports
from Germany was US$4.3 million in 1954, 9.1 million in 1961,
about 80.0 million in 1969 and 416 million in 1976. 7 For more than
a decade there has been a trade surplus for the ROC, with the
single exception of 1974. (This is also the case regarding the U.S.
but not Japan.)
A comparison with other major trading partners of the ROC
shows that Germany ranks at third place after the U.S. and
Japan, although there is still a broad gap between Germany and
those two countries concerning trade exchange with the ROC. It
would seem, however, that the ROC Government is attempting to
intensify the trade with European countries in order to avoid
dependence on any single country.8 The trade deficits with Japan
are a particular object of concern, although Chinese specialists see
clearly enough that the time of economic independence from
Japan is "a long way off," 9 and that the competitiveness of

7. Sources: AHD vol. 16 (1962), at 376; TIP vol. 5,No. 2 (Feb. 1,1977).
Shipments and financing of the FRG through Hong Kong are not
contained in these figures, which only reflect the direct foreign trade relations of
both countries. In terms of merchandise, the imports from Taiwan consist at the
present time of 35% textiles and 20% canned goods, the remainder being products of
light industries as plastics and electrical. See, e.g., Lien-he pao (Taipei), Dec. 19,
1974.
8. In "Foreign Trade Development in the Republic of China," issued by the
Board of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Economic Affairs (1976) it says that "our
private enterprises have been urged to procure more sophisticated, high quality
machinery and equipment from European countries..." (p. 11). And the Secretary
General of the Council for International Economic Cooperation and Development
of the ROC appealed in 1968 to European business men "not (to) give up Taiwan as
a captive market for Japanese and American suppliers" (see S. Y. Dao, How to
Strengthen Economic Relations between the Republic of China and Western
Europe, in: Chronique de Politique Etrangbre, vol. 21 (1968), at 709, 719). From May
25 to June 15, 1969, a "European Industrial Machinery Exhibition" took place in
Taipei. It was sponsored by the Council for International Economic Cooperation
and Development and the Free China Europe Industrial Institute. The share of
German industry was more than 50% of the total participants (eight West
European countries). In the summer of 1973 a Chinese trade delegation consisting
of 13 representatives of Chinese companies visited the main commercial and
industrial centers in Western Europe. With the support of the Government, Chinese
commercial and industrial circles in Taiwan established in Nov. 1975 a "Society
for the Promotion of Chinese-European Trade."
9. Quoted in AHD, vol. 26 (1972), at 914: Europa-Orientierung Taiwans.
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European products remains adversely affected by Europe's high
labor costs and the distance separating Europe and Taiwan.
In contrast to foreign trade, the export of private German
capital to Taiwan is rather limited in volume. Up to the present
time little more than a dozen German firms have established
themselves as government-approved direct investors in Taiwan.
All but one are fully owned subsidiaries 1° and are producing
mainly in the fields of chemistry, electronics, optics and clothes.
Most of them are situated in the Export Processing Zones, and
only the few looking for a local market are outside the zones.
The development of German direct investment in Taiwan is
expressed by the following figures:1" Starting from 1972, the total
investment was US$3.7 million in that year, 4.1 in 1973, 5.3 in
1974, 6.6 in 1975, and up to June 30, 1976 already 6.9.12
It is obvious that the gap between Germany on the one hand
and Japan and the U.S. on the other is even wider concerning
direct investment than it is in the case of trade. It is not surprising
that the ROC government tries to reduce the domination of single
countries in favor of a more balanced foreign investment
situation. A special need for such a balance seems to be felt
concerning investments in the fields of electronics and automobile
parts. In March 1972 the Vice-Chairman of the Council for
International Economic Cooperation and Development of the
10. One is a joint venture with local firms; another a joint venture with a
Japanese firm. From the German experience it would seem that the ROC
government does not follow the general trend in the developing countries towards
emphasizing joint ventures. For an assessment of the contribution of joint ventures
to the development of the South Korean economy see Chang Young Kim, Der
Beitrog von partnerschafts. Unternehmen (Joint Ventures) zum Eutwicklungsprozess. Dargestellt am Beispiel der Republik Korea, Ph.D. thesis, Kbln 1971.
11. Source: Information from the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs. See
also also Jahresbericht of the Ostasiatischen Vereins e.V. 1975/1976, p. 32. This is
little less than investments in the Republic of Korea, only a third of those in Hong
Kong, a fifth of Indonesia, a seventh of Singapore and less than a fifteenth of
German investment in Japan. According to paragraphs 55 and 56 of the Foreign
Economy Regulations (Aussenwirtschaftsverordnung) promulgated by the Federal
Government in 1966, German capital exports are to be notified to the German
Federal Bank and are published in the Federal Bulletin. All information
concerning the investor is protected by a secrecy clause. The above-mentioned
figures, of course, do not contain the quite considerable capital sums which are
raised by German companies on the well functioning Asia-Dollar market.
12. Within the last 25 years the total investment of European countries was
US$194,437,000 (i.e., 17.73% of all foreign investments), as compared to
US$491,810,000 (i.e., 44.83%) of the US and US$246,632,000 (i.e., 22.48%) of Japan.
Source: F.A. no. 3/1977 (Feb. 10, 1977), at 4.

CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS

ROC explained at the International Conference on Foreign
Investment in Asian Developing Countries held in Hamburg the
13
"Reasons and Motives for German Investment in Taiwan,"'
clearly with the intention of appealing to potential German
investors. An increase of German capital export to Taiwan is very
probable. Negotiations concerning a big German investment
project in the field of electronics have just been successfully
concluded.
Let me now turn to the consideration of some specific legal
problems which emerge in the economic relations between the two
countries.
III. LEGAL ASPECTS OF TRADE AND INVESTMENT

A.

The Institutional Framework

After July 3, 1941, when the Chinese Republic - then in
Chungching - cut off diplomatic relations with Germany (the
German government had two days before recognized the Wang
Ching-wei government of Nanjing), and after the end of the Wang
Ching-wei regime in 1945, Germany has never established
diplomatic relations with the ROC. There are no agreements in
force between the two countries. Consequently, the existing
economic relations are of a purely private nature, little aided by
governmental encouragement and international legal assistance.14
In view of this situation the institutional framework for
economic cooperation is merely of a private and - as far as
Chinese representation in Germany is concerned - of a semiofficial (if at all) character. 15 The representation of ROC economic
interests in the Federal Republic is institutionalized in the Far
East Trade Service Center, which deals with trade relations
13. For W.H. Fei's speech see: Industry of Free China (Tzi-yu Chung-Kuo chi
kung-ye), vol. XXXVII, No. 3 (March 1972), at 2.
14. On a governmental level there was only "technical help" for a short time
at the end of the sixties, limited in volume (2.3 mill. DM) and dropping to none
when diplomatic relations were established with the PRC. (Information from the
Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation to the author.)
15. But even less official than Japan-ROC relations, which are characterized
by simply changing the label. Former diplomatic personnel now work in the
"Japan-Taiwan Interchange Association" (offices in Taipei and Kaohsiung) and
the "East Asia Relations Association" (offices in Tokyo, Osaka and Fukuoka).
Both organizations concluded an agreement on Dec. 26, 1972 concerning
"Commerce, economy and culture" (see China aktuell, Hamburg, Dec. 1972, at 14.)
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between Taiwan and Germany, and the Asia Trade Center, which
consists of three bodies: one responsible for purchase from all
Europe, one dealing with investment services concerning all
European investors, and one dealing with German-ROC tourism.
Both Centers have their seat in Frankfurt/Main and have close
contact with the ROC Ministry of Economic Affairs. Cultural and
political information is offered by the Far East Information
Service, with branches in Bonn, Hamburg and West Berlin.
As far as German organizations are concerned, only the East
Asia Association (Ostasiatischer Verein e.V.) of Hamburg and
Bremen can be mentioned. This private association of German
businessmen interested in the Far East was founded in 1900 and
is engaged in the cultivation of trade relations with this region,
including the ROC. The German economy is so far not represented
in the ROC. The German Cultural Centers in Taipei and
Kaohsiung are .not prepared to be of any assistance in economic
matters; there are no German banking and commercial institutions. Information concerning investment projects in Taiwan can
be received, however, from the German Consulate General in
16
Hong Kong.

B.

Does This Lack of Diplomatic Relations Have a
Disturbing Impact on the Execution of Foreign
Trade and Investment Programs?
1.

Protection of Investments

Foreign direct investments can be protected by different legal
means. The domestic legal order of the capital receiving country,
the contract between the government of this country and the
foreign investor, finally a bilateral or multilateral international
legal order all may be concerned with such protection.
The lack of diplomatic relations between the Federal Republic
and the ROC frustrates the development of a bilateral international legal order in favor of the protection of German investments. Since 1959 the Federal Republic has concluded with 37

16. In contrast to the German absence of economic representation in Taiwan,
the Confederation of British Industries plans the establishment of an office in
Taipei with a "residential manager," and British and Canadian banks will open
branches in Taiwan. In 1974 an office of the "Australia-Free China Society,"
which represents Australian economic interests in Taiwan, was opened (see China
aktuell Hamburg, May 1974, at 227).
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developing countries so-called "investment-protection agreements."' 7 They are intended to assist in creating more favorable
conditions for private investments through a guarantee of legal
protection, especially against expropriation based on an international legal commitment. Whereas the government of the USA
relies for this purpose"8 on its traditional form of Treaties of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, the German government
chose with its "investment-protection agreements" a new way. It
is characterized by being shaped for the special needs of
developing countries and is confined to the protection of capital; it
does not contain any provisions concerning commerce and
freedom of settlement. 19
Such an agreement was of course not concluded with the
ROC. Although German investors have confidence in the ROC
legal order - German lawyers feel at home in a legal system
which is shaped according to the civil law system and especially
according to German law - there lacks the confirmation and
attestation of the relevant contents of this domestic legal order by
an international legal commitment. While the value of an
investment-protection agreement might be contested, 20 the nonconsideration of the ROC within the agreement system of the
German government leads to problems concerning the
investment-risk guarantee which may be obtained by German
citizens or companies under the German investment guarantee

17. See Justus Alenfeld, Die Investitionsfdrderungsvertrtige der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Frankfurt a. M., 1971 and Helmut Frick, Bilateraler Investitionsschutz in Entwicklungslandern. Ein Vergleich der Vertragssysteme der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Berlin 1975.
18. The justification for such U.S. treaties was expressed as follows: ". . . to
reduce the special hazards to which overseas investment may be exposed by reason
of unfavourable laws or judicial conditions. Rigid exchange controls, inequitable
tax statutes, or drastic expropriation laws are not conducive to the free flow of
capital, and it is against obstacles of this kind that these treaties are directed," in:
UN Doc. E/3021, at 40.
19. The standard contents of these agreements is mainly as follows: clause of
non-discrimination (art. 2); provision against expropriation and for sufficient
compensation (art. 3); guarantee of free transfer of capital and profits (art. 4);
provisions concerning the transfers (art. 6, 7) and the jurisdiction in case of dispute
settlement (art. 11).
20. See, e.g., Ingrid Delupis, Finance and Protection of Investments in
Developing Countries, Epping, Essex 1973, at 34 f. She argues that investment
guarantee agreeeements add "little or nothing to what would anyway apply under
international law."
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program 21 (covering the risks of war, inconvertibility, and
expropriation or confiscation). The main condition for receiving
such a guarantee is the existence of an investment-protection
is
agreement. The chief significance of such an agreement
22
therefore its link to the national guarantee scheme.
The problem resulting from this legal mechanism for the
potential investor in Taiwan is as obvious as it is surmountable.
According to information from the Federal Ministry of Economic
Affairs, an ad hoc declaration of the Chinese government
(Ministry of Economic Affairs) presented to the German investor
concerning legal protection is required and is sufficient for
participating in the national guarantee scheme. This declaration
must contain an agreement on the exclusive jurisdiction of the
arbitration tribunal according to the 1966 World Bank Convention
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of other States (International Center for the Settlement
of Investment Disputes, New York). 23 Up to the present there
exists only one investment case which produced such a declaration. 24 Other German investors just don't take advantage of the
Federal investment guarantee. They are aware that they are
participating in Taiwan's export boom and that their investments
will have amortized within about three years. The Federal
guarantee thus does not appear to be of major importance.
In this context it may be interesting to take into consideration
the results of a study of the Hamburg Institute for International
Economics (Hamburges Weltwirtschafts-Archiv) concerning German investments in developing countries. Better support to be
21. See, e.g., paragraph 20 1, No. 3 of the Bundeshaushaltsgesetz of 1969, April
18, 1969, BGBI. 1969 II, 793 ff. Corresponding provisions are in the subsequent
Federal Budget Laws.
22. This function of the treaties is also emphasized by E. J. Nwogugu, The
Legal Problems of Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, Manchester, 1965,
at 70: "These are important and expensive protective measures which provide a
firm basis for the insurance of investments."
23. ROC and FRG have both ratified the Convention. See Joy Cherian,
Investment Contracts and Arbitration. The World Bank Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes, Leyden, 1975. List of signatories at 121. See
also AHD vol. 23 (1969), at 532. The ROC deposited its ratification on Dec. 10, 1968,
see ILM (1969), at 446.
24. The legal nature of this aal hoc declaration might be questioned. For this
complex problem, see, e.g., A.A. Fatouros, Government Guarantees to Foreign
Investors, New York and London 1962, at 120 ff., 190ff., and K.-H. Bbckstiegel, Der
Staat als Vertragspartner ausltindischer Privatunternehmen, Frankfurt 1971; see
also chapter 2 of Delupis (supra note 20).
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extended by West German diplomatic missions abroad and the
conclusion of investment pacts and of agreements on avoiding
double taxation were among the proposals which German
companies who had answered the Institute's questionnaires
recommended for making
it easier and more profitable to invest in
25
developing countries.

2.

Trademark and Patent Protection

The mutual protection of trademarks was not possible for a
long time. The Chinese Trademark Law provides that "an
application for registration of a trademark may be refused
acceptance if it is filed by a national of a foreign country which
has not concluded with the ROC a treaty of agreement for
reciprocal protection of trademarks or which, by its national law
does not admit of trademark applicationby nationalsof the ROC"
(paragraph 1, art. 3, Trademark Law of July 4, 1972). According to
the German trademark law of January 2, 1968, a foreigner who
has no fixed establishment in Germany is protected by the law
only when the Federal Bulletin announces that the applicant's
home country protects German trademarks to the same extent as
those of its own nationals (paragraph 35, art. 1). Thus neither
trademark law states as a precondition for mutual protection the
mere existence of treaty relations.2 6 Because the ROC is not a
member of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property (1891, repeatedly revised) or any other convention by
which mutual trademark protection would be guaranteed without
the above-mentioned announcement in the Federal Bulletin, this
protection can only be achieved by undertaking the two one-sided
measures provided for in the trademark laws of both countries.
However, it was only in July, 1967 that the Federal Bulletin
announced that German trademarks are admitted in the ROC for
legal protection to the same extent as Chinese trademarks, 27 thus
expanding the protection of German trademark law to Chinese
trademarks.

25. See Awni-Al-Ani, supra note 1, at 221.
26. But this was the case before the revision of the ROC trademark law in
1958.
27. BGB1. I, at 549 and 574 (July 21, 1967): Notification of the Federal Ministry
of Justice. Not mentioned in the standard work of German trademark law:
Baumbach-Hefermehl, Wettbewerbs- and Warenzeichenrecht, 10th edition, Munich
1969, under art. 35.
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The situation concerning the protection of inventions is less
complicated insofar as the German patent law does not discriminate between German and foreign applicants. Applicants who live
abroad merely have the obligation to appoint a domestic
representative (art. 16, patent law of January 2, 1968). The
relevant provision of the valid Chinese patent law (art. 14) is
identical with that of the cited trademark law, thus leaving patent
2
protection for foreigners beyond the need of treaty relations.
3. Copyright Protection of Designs
Another example for the execution of economic relations
under the given circumstances is an arrangement concerning the
protection of copyright in design, which was reached in summer
1976 on a private basis between the German and the Taiwan
Textile Federation (TTF). For western merchants in East Asian
countries imitation of designs is a matter of some concern. There
is quite considerable imitation in Taiwan, but the legal measures
of the domestic legal order are insufficient: there is neither a
separate law concerning protection of copyright in design nor a
special legislation concerning the repression of unfair competition. 29
28. There are some German trademarks registered in the ROC. For figures
concerning the patents issued to Germans see Cosway-Ma-Shattuck at 474, table
39.
For some comparative figures concerning applications of patents and
trademarks of Asian countries in Germany see the following table:
Statistical Data Concerning Applications of East-Asian
Countries in the German Patent Office
Patent applications

Country

ROC
Singapore
S. Korea
Japan

Trademark applications

1973

1974

1975

1976

1973

1974

1975

1976

4
0
3
4962

12
2
4
5122

9
1
2
4322

19
1
7
4643

0
2
0
323

0
1
0
301

1
2
4
213

2
3
3
322

Source: Information from the President of the German Patent Office (Munich)
to the author.
29. See Teruo Doi, in: Cosway-Ma-Shattuck, at 462.
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The above-mentioned arrangement between the textile federations took as its model a governmental agreement which was
concluded shortly before (in June 1976) between the Federal
Republic and Hong Kong. The principles of this agreement may
be summarized as follows:30 The Federal government is entitled to
present to the government of Hong Kong concrete cases showing
imitations of German designs in the field of textiles and clothes.
The Hong Kong government will examine - according to the law
of Hong Kong - whether a German design was wrongfully
reproduced. If this is the case, it will employ certain measures in
order to avoid further infringement. If consultations between the
Hong Kong government and the company involved show that the
designs were given by a German ordering firm to the producer in
Hong Kong without the title to use them, then the government of
Hong Kong is prepared to communicate the name of the ordering
firm at the request of the German government.
The arrangement between the Chinese and German textile
organizations is based on similar principles. Measures to prevent
an infringement of copyright in design, including communication
of the name of the German ordering firm, are based on the private
legal relationship between TTF and the respective producer. This,
however, already shows the limits of the arrangement. It concerns
only textiles; moreover, TTF can only communicate information it
has received from its members. Therefore it is not surprising that,
despite the many infringements in Taiwan, the practical relevance of the arrangement is virtually nil. Up to the present only
two cases were communicated to the German Textile Federation.
4. Claims of a German OrderingFirm
Insuperable problems can arise if claims of a German
ordering firm against the Chinese producer - e.g., because of
deficiency in the quality of the supplies - are made. The lack of
diplomatic relations and thus of an official commercial representation in Taiwan impedes the contact with Chinese companies
and an examination of their soundness, thus increasing the
ordering firm's risk. Moreover, more than two-thirds of the goods
destined for export have to be checked according to the "Commodity Inspection Law." 31 Article 8 provides that such commodities
30. According to Bundesministerium Wirtschaft, Tagesnachricht No. 7245 of
June 30, 1976.
31. Promulgated on December 14, 1932, amended on May 25, 1965 and
September 3, 1970.
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are to be inspected according to the CNS (China National
Standard). A possible divergence from the European standard
may result in claims by the European ordering firm. It is
suggested that Chinese lawyers do not always handle such claims
with sufficient emphasis, and that it is sometimes difficult to
reach court decisions.
5. FRG Risk Guarantees
Finally, the Federal Guarantees regarding risks of manufacture (risk before shipping) and export (risk after shipping) which
can be granted to German exporters may be mentioned.3 2 They are
not affected by considerations concerning the nature of the stateto-state relationship.
C. Consequences of EEC Common Commercial
Policy for FRG-ROC Trade
As far as trade is concerned, the membership of the Federal
Republic in the EEC takes on significance. What are the
consequences of the EEC foreign trade policy for Chinese-German
trade?
1.

The Commercial Policy of the EEC and Protective
Measures as an Exception to the Principle
of UnrestrictedImportation

Articles 110 to 116 of the EEC Treaty deal with the common
commercial policy of the community. The necessity for such a
policy derives from the fact that the EEC is founded on a full
customs union and therefore presents a common face to exporters
from non-EEC countries.3 3 After the expiry of the transitional
period for the implementation of the EEC Treaty, "the common
commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles" (art. 113)
with regard to both import and export policy. 34 Under EEC
Regulation 1025/70 a common system to be applied to imports

32. The treatment of all relevant guarantees are delegated to the "Hermes
Kreditversicherungs-Aktiengesellschaft" (Hamburg) and the "Deutsche Revisionsund Treuhand-Aktiengesellschaft."
33. See A. Parry, EEC Law, London and New York, 1977, No. 37-13.
34. For the progress made towards a common foreign trade law see Parry,
supra note 33, No. 37-27 ff., and Ehle-Meier, EWG-Warenverkehr. AuBenhandelZblle-Subventionen, Koln 1971, at 419 ff.
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from non-EEC countries was established.3 5 Its basic principle is
that of unrestricted importation. It means - together with its
counterpart in regard to EEC exports - that foreign trade with
third countries cannot be subjected to quantitative restrictions. In
a case of emergency, however, this unrestricted foreign trade can
be suspended for a specific period 38 through an introduction of
quantitative restrictions. Because of its exceptional character,
these restrictions have to take place within narrow limits,
particularly shaped by the principles of statutory reserve and of
proportion. The institutions of the Community and the member
states have only the right to issue specific protective measures
when the statutory preconditions exist, i.e., when by the import
situation the producers of same or similar goods within the
Community will suffer a substantial damage. The Community
regulations take the principle of proportion into account by
factual, temporal and local limits. The type of "appropriate
measures" (art. 11, Reg. No. 1025/70) can be: introduction of a
license, fixing an import quota, issuing an instruction to stop all
imports. A newer measure consists of so-called "agreements of
self-limitation," 37 which result practically in an import quota
system.
Protection Measures Regarding Imports
from the ROC
3
The ROC was never officially linked with the EEC. 8
Nevertheless, in 1971 an agreement was concluded concerning the
trade in cotton. 39 This agreement was based on the 1962 Long
Term Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Cotton
2.

Textiles -

Taiwan was a member of this arrangement -

and

introduced quantitative restrictions by fixing certain quotas for
the importation of various cotton textiles. This ROC-EEC
35. Text: ABI. 1970, L 124 of June 8, 1970, p. 6; see also Regulation 1439/74,
Abl. L 159, June 15, 1974.
36. There is the same mechanism in the GATT legal system.
37. Their compatibility with the GATT is doubtful; see, e.g., R. Zimmer, Zur
Problematik von Exportselbstbeschr~nkungen, in AWD vol. 15 (1969), 297-300.
38. In 1963 the ROC government applied to the EEC Commission in order to
accredit its ambassador in Brussels to the Community. It seems that the
institutions of the EEC were about to express consent see AHD vol. 18, 1964, at
116) when at the beginning of 1964 the breaking off of diplomatic relations
between the ROC and France took place, and the establishment of official relations
with the EEC was never realized.
39. ABI. February 2, 1971, No. L 43/22.
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arrangement had a term of three years, but was respected from
the end of 1973 until June 1975 through a unilateral decision of
the EEC. From July 1975 the governmental agreement was
replaced by a unilateral EEC commercial policy toward Taiwan,
by introducing quotas in the field of textiles. 40 This regulation
followed lines similar to the 1971 agreement but was extended in
its contents from cottons alone to all textiles. This extension
caused a considerable change in the European-ROC trade
relationship. Textiles presently make up more than one-third of
the total exports from Taiwan to the Common Market. In the 1971
agreement only the comparatively small share of cottons was
subjected to EEC import quotas, whereas the quotas concerning
all other textiles remained to be fixed by the several member
states. With the 1975 regulation the most sensitive part of the
textile sector was put under EEC import restriction. During the
last two years - in order to mention a pars pro toto - the EEC
has introduced by regulations issued by both the Commission and
the Council protective measures (usually import license requirements) concerning imports of textiles, canned mushrooms and
pipe joints made from malleable cast iron for several EEC
e.g., concerning
countries. There were also antidumping measures,
41
imports of bicycle chains from Taiwan.
I may add that the ROC does not enjoy - probably because of
political considerations - the benefits of the Generalized System
of Preferences for developing countries sponsored by UNCTAD,
which the EEC adopted in July 1971.42
3.

EEC Impact on FRG-ROC Trade

As far as the significance of EEC commercial policy for ROCGerman trade is concerned, at present only imports of textiles

40. Regulation No. 1783/75 of July 10, 1975, ABI. No. L 182. The Taiwanese
textile production was several times the subject of discussion in the European
Parliament.

41. ABl. C 138, August 7, 1976. For the introduction of a temporary antidumping duty in this case see the regulation of the Commission of November 12,
1976, ABI. No. L 312/41, November 11, 1976.
42. The Community offers, unilaterally, tariff-free quotas of semi-finished and
finished industrial goods to the seventy-seven (now more than hundred) developing
countries. See, e.g., H. Kramer, Zwei Jahre Zollprtiferenzen der Europtischen
Gemeinschaften zugensten von Entwicklungslandern. Methoden und erste
Ergebnisse, in: Die Weltwirtschaft 1973, 1. Heft, pp. 196ff.
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restricted, in that a German import authorizafrom Taiwan are
43
tion is required.

IV. CONCLUSION

Let me summarize: The German economy is an important
trade partner but is somewhat reluctant to employ productive
capital; this, however, is gradually changing. The existing
institutional framework is regarded as sufficient for the execution
of trade and investment projects. The lack of diplomatic relations
is not felt as a heavy burden. Existing difficulties, as in the case of
claims, could be minimized by a more effective - of course,
unofficial - German representation (banking and commercial
institutions) in Taiwan, or, as in the case of the protection of
designs, by additional private arrangements and by new Chinese
legislation. The protection of direct investments in Taiwan seems
to be on a firm basis, even without the investor's interests being
secured under international law. The significance of protective
measures based on EEC law for an assessment of the WestEuropean markets and consequently for ROC industries remains
an important matter of concern.
You will have realized that I have only mentioned those
legally relevant aspects which develop on the surface of economic
relations with the ROC, aspects which are more or less familiar to
every lawyer dealing with foreign trade problems, and are not
necessarily linked to a specific cultural background. Implications
of cultural phenomena and their significance for international
business transactions are not easy to analyze. 44 Nevertheless, we
all know that they should not be neglected if reliable legal
counselling is to be achieved. Negotiations concerning a dispute
settlement clause, for instance, take on a quite different significance when they concern a contract with, say, a French partner
than in commerce with Chinese merchants who are well known
for their ability to compromise, although we must be sensitive
enough to realize where the cliche begins.
Only an insight into the socio-cultural environment of the
trading partner renders a responsible commercial contact possi43. Based on EEC regulation 1439/74 of July 4, 1974 (see note 35 supra). See,
e.g., Reg. No. 1782/75, ABI. No. L 182/1, of July 12, 1975; No. 3045/75, ABI. No. L
3045/75, ABI. No. L 303/26 of November 22, 1975.
44. See, e.g., A. T. von Mehren, The Significance of Cultural and Legal
Diversity for International Transactions, in: Ius Privaturn Gentium, Festschrift fUr
Max Rheinstein, vol. 1, TUbingen 1969, pp. 247-57.
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ble. This includes a deeper concern with the legal systems
involved. Chinese representatives in Germany have confirmed
that a closer cooperation between Chinese and German lawyers
could contribute in smoothing the way to a solution of trade and
investment problems and in participating in arbitration and
conciliation.
Dr. Sigur thanked Dr. Heuser and also expressed his
appreciation to the three panelists for adhering to the time limit.
He then invited the three discussants to speak. The first
discussant was Mr. Ralph Clough of the Brookings Institution.
Mr. Clough, Dr. Sigur pointed out, had served in the American
foreign service and was acting ambassador (charge d'affaire) at
the American Embassy in Taipei several years ago. Mr. Clough
has written extensively on Asia and American policy.
Mr. Clough stated that Dr. Heuser presented clearly the
obstacles to trade between West Germany and Taiwan, but
showed how many had been overcome, permitting trade with the
ROC to increase substantially. Mr. Clough presented some
questions for Mr. Heuser: Do merchants have travel problems?
Are trade fairs permitted? How does lack of diplomatic relations
with Germany affect Taiwan's trade as compared to its trade with
France and Canada, or compared to German trade with South
Korea? Mr. Clough stated that Dr. Wu and Dr. Yeh make a strong
case that United States economic interests in Taiwan would be
best served by the adoption of a two-China policy, but do not take
account of overall U.S. interests. For one thing, the paper may
have underestimated the People's Republic of China's potential as
a trade partner with the United States. Mr. Clough pointed out
that in some years Japanese trade with the People's Republic of
China exceeded its trade with Taiwan. He added that both the
paper done by Dr. Wu and Dr. Yeh and the Chamber of Commerce
paper discussed the adverse effects of normalization, but did not
discuss possibilities for mitigating these adverse effects, as, for
example, by legislation providing for continuing access to
Eximbank loans.
[The following is the summary of Mr. Clough's statement.]

